Thank you Ferit, I admit original post contains a lot of disputable, controversial statements. I’m unsure too, I just wanted to initiate a meaningful discussion.
Some lessons learned - next time I’ll keep one proposal per post, so that it is possible to keep the conversation focused.
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On the front end, as I understand, if you get to the max round the appeal button will still be there, but the fees will be unpayable.
With jurorsForCourtJump=511 and starting with three jurors, the current max should be eight rounds. Changing jurorsForCourtJump to bring that down to seven is a defendable proposal.
Logic to allow settlements would certainly be useful. It is somewhat complicated by the fact that we let third parties/jurors appeal (so that for example a juror who thinks she was on the wrong side of an initial round mistaken decision can prompt a review to the right decision), but in an escrow case allowing the two parties to split whatever was initially at stake via a settlement and leave (even if third parties are still fighting about the dispute) would be a good functionality.
Requiring 2/3 supermajorities is not a good idea in my opinion as it reduces the threshold for 51% attacks.
Can you explain the 2/3 supermajority and 51% attack treshhold?
Well, going to some kind of (weighted) coin flip (if I understood your proposal correctly) if you don’t have a 2/3 juror majority by the last round opens up the door for an attacker with 34% to be able to force you to a coin flip. If the value at stake is high enough that could be a viable attack.
I can see an argument for preventing appeals beyond a certain point if the previous round was super decisive - e.g. If the round of 255 voted 2/3 for A there is little chance that the round of 511 (which essentially draws from the same population) is going to vote at least 1/2 for B based on the random fluctuations one would expect based on which jurors were selected. Having that extra appeal still adds some bribe resistance, as an attacker would a priori have to offer large bribes in both rounds, but it does make an attack by a whale appealing frivolously more viable. So there is a tradeoff there.