On the estimates for juror effort, totally if the estimated effort that is included in the calculator is no longer appropriate, then that should be updated. The estimates for effort of different types of juror task that are included in the calculator are completely subjective, so the more feedback jurors in different courts give about those the better.
The parameters you propose here satisfy all of the constraints in the calculator except for the contraint that the calculator takes to make the “lazy” strategy of always voting for the moment common answer in the court unprofitable. Indeed, this is the condition that is currently making the deposit so high in this court. (As you point in your motivation, the issue is that the percentage of rulings that reject profiles is quite high. To correct the statistics you cite, as of the last time I checked these values in November it is around 86% of rulings that vote to reject profiles. However, when you include the rate at which jurors who vote to reject are overturned by “accept” being crowdfunded but without a further juror vote, a juror who always votes to reject is seen by the court contract as being coherent 91% of the time. So a quite high deposit is necessary to make it so that the strategy of always voting to reject has a negative expected return. On the other hand, 97% of jurors overall are ruled as coherent in this court, so even with a high deposit the expected return of honestly ruling on the case is still positive. See this document for somewhat more complete tables with these values: Parameters - November 2022 - Google Docs Note that there are voting/incentive systems that are designed to better handle these types of situations where there is one outcome that observed much more often than others. In v1, there is the same voting/incentive system in all courts and the system that is used was chosen for its resistance against 51% attacks as well as its simplicity. Eventually, in v2 with its modular design, conceivably the court that handles PoH cases can use a different system and then you can go back to something more 51% attack resistant upon appeal.)
However, maybe the contraints the calculator is taking are overkill. It is trying to find parameters such that E[honest]>0>E[lazy]. Maybe it is enough to have E[honest]>E[lazy] and E[honest]>0. Then the lazy strategy is potentially profitable, but jurors who follow it are accepting an opportunity cost by not taking the time to review the case which would have given them a higher expected return. If you assume juror effort of 30 USD, the parameters you propose satisfy that.